Fairness and its Price in Some Resource Allocation Problems
来源：太阳集团tcy8722网站
发布时间：2019-06-17
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报告人：Prof. Bo CHEN
报告题目：Fairness and its Price in Some Resource Allocation Problems
时间：6月20日下午15:30-16:30
地点：欧阳纯美楼316室
摘要：We first give a brief introduction to the formalization of the notion of fairness. Then we investigate the concept of price of fairness in resource allocation and apply it to two-agent single-machine scheduling problems, in which two agents, each having a set of jobs, compete for use of a single machine to execute their jobs. We consider the situation where one agent aims at minimizing the total of the completion times of his jobs, while the other seeks to minimize the maximum tardiness with respect to a common due date for her jobs. We provide a tight bound on the price of fairness for each notion of fairness. We extend our study further to the problem in which both agents wish to minimize the total of the
completion times of their own jobs.
报告人简介：Professor Bo Chen (陈礴), Chair of Operations Research & Management Science and Co-director of DIMAP (Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications), University of Warwick, UK. He is Fellow of the UK Operational Research Society (FORS), Fellow of the UK Institute of Mathematics and Its Applications (FIMA), and Fellow of the UK Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS). He has been a Nominator for Nobel Prize in Economics since 2006. He currently serves as Associate Editor for ten international academic journals of high standing. His main research interests include optimization, scheduling and transportation, and game theory with mechanism design.
联系人：谈之奕（tanzy@zju.edu.cn）
报告题目：Fairness and its Price in Some Resource Allocation Problems
时间：6月20日下午15:30-16:30
地点：欧阳纯美楼316室
摘要：We first give a brief introduction to the formalization of the notion of fairness. Then we investigate the concept of price of fairness in resource allocation and apply it to two-agent single-machine scheduling problems, in which two agents, each having a set of jobs, compete for use of a single machine to execute their jobs. We consider the situation where one agent aims at minimizing the total of the completion times of his jobs, while the other seeks to minimize the maximum tardiness with respect to a common due date for her jobs. We provide a tight bound on the price of fairness for each notion of fairness. We extend our study further to the problem in which both agents wish to minimize the total of the
completion times of their own jobs.
报告人简介：Professor Bo Chen (陈礴), Chair of Operations Research & Management Science and Co-director of DIMAP (Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications), University of Warwick, UK. He is Fellow of the UK Operational Research Society (FORS), Fellow of the UK Institute of Mathematics and Its Applications (FIMA), and Fellow of the UK Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS). He has been a Nominator for Nobel Prize in Economics since 2006. He currently serves as Associate Editor for ten international academic journals of high standing. His main research interests include optimization, scheduling and transportation, and game theory with mechanism design.
联系人：谈之奕（tanzy@zju.edu.cn）